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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on governance modes for service development of mobile telephone 
networks (GSM, WAP, GPRS, UMTS). ‘Services’ refer to services embodying a specific 
content. The paper shows that the phase of the life cycle of the network and the service 
affects the choice of governance mode of new service development projects. Governance 
modes include internal development by the telecom operator, several forms of collabora-
tion between telecom operator and service firm, and only providing a network by the 
telecom operator to the service firm, which then develops and provides its services (ex-
ternal). In this paper a model is developed for the governance mode of service develop-
ment in different phases of the life cycles of the mobile network and service, based on the 
degrees of uncertainty and urgency involved in the network and service development 
processes. Four cases are presented of service development projects for mobile telecom 
networks. These cases indicate that the number of redesigns and the level of communica-
tion costs in collaboration projects indeed depend on the degree of urgency and uncer-
tainty involved in these projects, which are in turn affected by the life cycle of the net-
work and service. 
 
Key-words: collaboration for service development, mobile networks, product and service 
life cycles.
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Introduction 
Services embodying content are indispensable for the success of mobile telecommunica-
tion networks. Examples of such services are route planners and location based restaurant 
guides. Services for mobile networks are not just modifications of existing Internet ser-
vices since the value of the use of mobile phones for the customer often depends on the 
availability of services and their characteristics, such as reference to the present location 
of the customer. Moreover, the format of the display of the mobile phones does not allow 
for displaying complete Internet pages. Thus, development work of new, dedicated ser-
vices is needed. 
In many cases it is not attractive for telecom operators to develop these services 
themselves. They often do not possess the content required, and many telecom operators 
are short of cash as a consequence of large investments in UMTS licenses. Recently, 
many authors have stressed the benefits of outsourcing innovation in general, facilitated 
by the increased benefits of IT (Hagel III and Singer, 1999; Quinn, 2000). On the other 
hand, outsourcing to independent service firms may create transaction costs for the tele-
com operator and service firm, particularly under high uncertainty and frequent changes 
of product design and target application (Bruce, 1995; Robertson and Langlois, 1995). 
Moreover service firms may not be willing to take risks under high uncertainty. 
In this paper, I advance the view that the most appropriate mode of governance of the 
service development process depends on the maturity of the network and the maturity of 
the service. Governance modes include internal development by the telecom operator, 
several forms of collaboration between telecom operator and service firm, and just pro-
viding a network by the telecom operator to the service firm, which then develops and 
provides its services (external). The ‘network’ refers not only to the physical communica-
tion infrastructure, but also to the software infrastructure that facilitates the provision of 
services on the network. Below, I will argue that for an assessment of the maturity of the 
network the degree to which a dominant type of use exists is also important.  
In the paper, based on the literature, I first discuss the degrees of uncertainty and 
urgency in network and service development related to the network and service life cy-
cles. This leads to a model to infer the most appropriate mode of governance of service 
development. Four cases are presented of service development projects for mobile tele-
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com networks. The cases have been selected to represent each of the four different situa-
tions distinguished in the model. In the discussion and conclusion I reflect on the appro-
priateness of the model and its practical implications. 
 
Uncertainty and urgency in product and service development 
Uncertainty during the product and service life cycles: 
The form of cooperation between telecom operator and service firm can be viewed from a 
resource based or transaction cost perspective (Nooteboom, 1999b, pp. 8-20). The re-
source based perspective emphasizes the importance of cooperation alliances to comple-
ment internal competencies and for learning purposes (Doz and Hamel, 1997). For tele-
com operators considerations resulting from this perspective underscore the importance 
of cooperating with outside parties. The transaction cost perspective (Nooteboom, 1999a, 
1999b, 2000; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991) is more in-
strumental in determining the form of cooperation, the object of this paper. Traditionally, 
transaction cost theory attempts to explain the choice between market and hierarchy, with 
many intermediate forms between the extremes.1 For a transaction costs perspective it is 
important that, depending on the maturity of the market, innovation increases uncertainty, 
which may stimulate the choice for internal development or more integrated forms of co-
operation. We can distinguish technological and market uncertainty as a consequence of 
innovation (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, pp. 109 ff). Technological uncertainty relates to 
the technical problems, to the technological knowledge that has to be generated, and to 
adaptations that have to be made in the development trajectory of the new product or ser-
vice. Market uncertainty refers to the behavior of competitors and customers and for in-
stance to substitutes that may appear. As a consequence of technological and market un-
certainty design changes may have to be made in the course of the development process, 
which require communication between the parties involved in joint development proc-
esses. Dependent on the mode of governance that is applied, uncertainty thus creates 
transaction costs, such as the costs of negotiation and contracting (Coase, 1996). 
 The product life cycle model (Abernathy, 1978; Abernathy and Utterback, 1979; 
Utterback, 1994) is relevant to assess the level of uncertainty involved in new service de-
velopment. The model was initially developed for products, not for services. The model 
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distinguishes three phases of maturity of a new product: fluid, transitional and specific 
(Utterback, 1994). In this model the dominant design separates the first, fluid phase from 
the transitional and specific phases. The dominant design is considered to be the result of 
choices of producers and/or customers. The dominant design has a technical aspect, relat-
ing to the dominant configuration of elements of the product or service, and a functional 
aspect, relating to the dominant preferences of users with regard to product features 
(Cusumano et al., 1992, p. 56). In the transitional phase, the basis of competition changes 
from product features to quality and cost of the product, and the orientation of firms 
changes from product innovation to process innovation. In the third, mature, phase the 
market stabilizes and competition focuses on differentiated products or services for spe-
cific market niches. It is clear that the level of uncertainty varies during the product life 
cycle, from high uncertainty on technology and market in the first fluid phase, decreasing 
rapidly during the transitional phase.  
This model can be applied to both telecom networks and new services. In this ar-
ticle telecom networks include physical networks, such as GPRS, but also protocols, such 
as WAP (Wireless Application Protocol, a mobile phone system with a facility to display 
information from Internet or other sources. WAP can be transmitted by GSM or other 
physical network), since these have the same dynamics. Telecom networks can be con-
sidered to form new products in the sense of the life cycle model. Additionally, when 
telecom authorities have agreed on a ‘de jure’ standard for the transmission system (Funk 
and Methe, 2001), de facto a number of technical choices, e.g. software standards, stan-
dards for the interfaces between network and services, and the technical specifications of 
the handsets and billing systems, still have to be made. The technical alignment that is 
required between the design of the telecom hardware and software and the service soft-
ware creates a high technological uncertainty in the fluid phase of the network. In the 
course of time, telecom firms develop standards to which services have to conform, 
which are often incorporated in so-called platforms. Such a platform provides the commu-
nication between service application and the mobile network, including the different types 
of handsets of customers. These platforms offer service providers easy access to the tele-
com network. By offering its services on a platform, a service provider does not yet have 
to bother about changing software standards; the service provider only has to adapt the 
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service to the specifications required by the platform, and the network or platform owner 
organizes the interface with other technical devices, particularly with the telecom net-
work and handsets. These platforms can thus be considered to be part of the dominant 
design of the network. Moreover, the dominant character of the services that will be of-
fered on the network, and the most important user preferences, can be considered part of 
the dominant design. These two features are uncertain in the early phase of a network. As 
a consequence of technological and market uncertainty, in the early fluid phase of a net-
work several adaptations of the service may be required before it successfully matches 
technical and market requirements. Sometimes market requirements will only become 
clear in repeated market experiments (Lynn et al., 1996). 
The life cycle model can also be applied to the services offered on the network. 
Barras (1986, 1990) has developed a ‘reverse product cycle’ for services, referring to the 
development of services in sectors, such as the banking sector, in reaction to the introduc-
tion of a new technology, starting with just the efficient replacement of existing services 
and leading later on to the development of completely new services. This dynamics has 
been noted by others for technology sectors (Van den Ende and Kemp, 1999, 834). Here I 
refer to the life cycle of single services, not to the development of services in sectors as a 
whole. The maturity of a service on mobile networks can be defined on the basis of its 
similarity to existing services that are distributed by other channels, with respect to their 
features and target customers. A new service on a mobile network can be considered in 
the fluid phase of the life cycle if it offers such new features to users that it creates a new 
market. Many location-based services are in this category, because they could not be of-
fered through other channels before. For a service in the fluid phase a search process will 
take place concerning the type of use and preferred features by users. A new service can 
be considered in the transitional or mature phase in the life cycle if it is a close copy of 
existing services offered by other channels. An example of this may be an electronic tele-
phone book offered on a mobile network. The service may have no additional features to 
existing telephone directories except for the fact that it can be reached independent of the 
location of the customer. In this case we do not expect to find the search process concern-
ing the use and features of the new service. 
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 The degree of uncertainty involved in service creation for mobile telecom net-
works depends on the phase in both the product and service life cycles. Technological 
and market uncertainty are high in the fluid phase of the mobile network, because the 
dominant design of the network has not yet been established and because the target cus-
tomer and the target uses are still uncertain. The degree of uncertainty is considerably 
lower in the specific and mature phases of the telecom network. In these phases informa-
tion is available on the standards applied in the network, on the size of the potential mar-
ket and on the type and preferences of the customer. The same counts for new services. If 
a new service is developed that resembles existing services closely, and which we thus 
consider to be in the transitional or mature phase of the life cycle, knowledge is available 
on market demand, also if the service is offered on a new network. Scale effects in offer-
ing services on different networks often reduce the risks involved, decreasing uncertainty 
even more. 
 
Urgency in product and service development: 
The life cycle perspective highlights another important consideration affecting the choice 
of mode of governance in service development for mobile networks: the need to offer 
unique and attractive products (in this case products and services) in the fluid phase of 
the life cycle of the network to acquire an installed based of customers (Shapiro and Var-
ian, 1999), to acquire the dominant design and to appropriate returns from the invest-
ments in product and service development. Teece (1986) has demonstrated the impor-
tance of complementary assets as a means to appropriate returns from innovations. The 
services provided on a telecommunications network can be considered complementary 
assets (to be more specific: related products) in the sense of Teece. Since in the early 
phase of the telecom network the telecom operator needs to acquire an installed base rap-
idly, the timely delivery of these complementary assets will often be critical.  
Lambe and Spekman (1997) have introduced the concept of urgency referring to 
the need for the innovator to develop products in a timely manner to acquire the dominant 
design. This also applies to the service firm developing a completely new service. The 
service must be offered in time to generate an early installed base. As a consequence the 
service firm may feel a high degree of urgency when it wants to bring a new service on 
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the market. The considerations on uncertainty and urgency during the product and service 
life cycles are reflected in figure 1. For both network and service the transitional and spe-
cific phases have been taken together, since these two phases are relatively close to each 
other in levels of uncertainty and urgency. 
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Figure 1:. Uncertainty and urgency during the phases of the life cycles of mobile telecom 
networks and services (‘telco’ refers to ‘telecom operator’).
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Governance modes 
Many authors have discussed governance modes for innovation with different degrees of 
integration in the firm. According to them the choice between these modes depends on 
the degree of product and process change involved (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), the 
degree of change in the market (Christensen, 1997), familiarity of the firm with technol-
ogy and market (Roberts, 1980; Roberts and Berry, 1985) and strategic importance of the 
innovation to the firm (Burgelman, Maidique and Wheelwright, 1996). The situation of 
service development for mobile networks is different from the single product develop-
ment situation discussed by these authors since two dependent products (a product and a 
service) are involved. Others have discussed the governance modes for the acquisition of 
complementary assets required for an innovation, and the implications of the product life 
cycle model for the choice of governance modes (Gemser et al. 1996; Lambe and Spek-
man, 1997; Teece, 1986). As mentioned above, services can be considered complemen-
tary assets for the development of the network. According to Robertson and Langlois 
(1995) the most appropriate mode of governance for the acquisition of complementary 
assets depends on the type and the degree of novelty involved in the innovation. These 
authors consider vertical integration most appropriate for very novel innovations of the 
so-called ‘strategic’ and systemic types (Robertson and Langlois, 1995, pp. 553-555). 
Nooteboom (2000) emphasizes the advantages of cooperation and contracting between 
different firms for the development of a radical innovation, although he also considers 
close relationships most appropriate when much of the knowledge involved is tacit 
(Nooteboom, 2000, p. 931). 
The development of services for mobile networks differs from the acquisition of 
complementary assets for an innovation since two dependent life cycles are involved. 
Both the network and the service have their own life cycle causing their own levels of 
uncertainty and urgency, which affect the appropriate governance mode of service devel-
opment. As has been mentioned above, uncertainty implies that design changes and high 
intensity of communication are required, which stimulate more integrated modes of gov-
ernance during the innovation process. In the case that the mobile network is well estab-
lished, the telecom operator can just offer the network to service firms to offer their ser-
vices to customers and a disintegrated mode of governance may be most appropriate. 
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Not only does the level of uncertainty affect the governance mode, the degree of 
urgency is also of influence (Lambe and Spekman, 1997). If the telecom operator is in a 
situation of high urgency, and depends on service providers to get the network adopted, 
he will have to be certain of the speed of the service development process and the quality 
of the service delivered. If the service provider feels a high level of urgency to get its ser-
vice adopted, he will also have to be certain of the reliable provision of the network by 
the telecom operator. In general, the distribution of decision rights (Nooteboom, 1999b, 
p. 67) can best be proportional to the degree of urgency felt by the two parties. The party 
with the highest decision rights will consequently also take the highest risks. 
These considerations can be translated into the model in figure 2. The two basic 
parameters are the phase of development of the network and service. The governance 
modes involved are internal, collaboration with different degrees of intensity and division 
of risks, and external. Service firms do not only refer to pure service providers, but also 
include suppliers of telecommunication equipment who enter the services market. The 
appropriateness of the governance modes is mainly judged from the perspective of effi-
ciency to deal with redesigns and with the intensity of communication required, and from 
the perspective of fit with the degree of urgency felt by the two partners. In the upper 
right hand quartile (1) innovation is incremental. The dominant design of the network has 
been established, both in a technological sense as well as with respect to user expecta-
tions concerning applications and features. The service has demonstrated to be successful 
on other networks and the service firm will generally be an established firm. Technologi-
cal and market are uncertainty low. The position of the two parties is identical in the 
sense that none of them will feel a high level of urgency. A low number of redesigns and 
a low intensity of communication are expected. A situation in which the telecom operator 
offers the network to the service firm seems most appropriate, particularly for reasons of 
efficiency. The risks can be left to the service firm, or, if it concerns a larger application, 
the risk can be shared between the telecom operator and the service firm. (2) In the lower 
right hand quartile technological uncertainty is low, and market uncertainty can be classi-
fied as medium: it is low for the network, since the market for the network is known, but 
it is high for the service. The urgency is low for the telecom operator, but high for the 
service firm. In this case, design changes will be required to match the features of the 
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service to the market, but the intensity of communication can be low since these design 
changes do not require communication between the telecom operator and service firm. A 
mode of government in which the telecom operator does not participate and leaves the 
risks to the service firm seems most appropriate. (3) In the upper left quartile technologi-
cal uncertainty is high. The interface between service and network (the above mentioned 
software infrastructure of the network) still has to be developed. Market uncertainty can 
again be classified as medium, but this time because it is high as far as the network is 
concerned, and low as far as the customer requirements with respect to the service are 
concerned, since the service has demonstrated to be successful on other networks. Ur-
gency will be high for the telecom operator, and low for the service firm. Redesigns of 
the service may be required because of new insights resulting from the development of 
the software of the network, and because of uncertainty on the target customers of the 
network. In this case a high intensity of communication between telecom operator and 
service firm is required, particularly to cope with design changes, and a high involvement 
of the telecom operator in terms of decision rights and risk taking. Since in this quartile 
the development of the service itself is a limited task, and large part of the design work 
concerns the interface between the service and the network. A governance mode involv-
ing a division of tasks between the telecom operator and the service firm seems most ap-
propriate, in which the service firm only develops the content of the new service and the 
telecom operator develops the network and the interface between network and service. 
Since this means that the telecom operator does the larger part of the design work, he also 
takes the largest part of the risks involved. (4) And finally, in the lower left quartile, in 
which the innovation is most radical, the uncertainty and urgency are highest. Redesigns 
have to be expected, and a high intensity of communication is required. Internal devel-
opment by the telecom operator or mode of governance in which a separate project or-
ganization is created by the telecom operator and the service firm seems most appropri-
ate. In both cases the telecom operator will be responsible for the development of the 
software infrastructure, and thus takes the largest part of the risks involved (or all risks in 
case of internal development). The model involves an increasing degree of intensity of 
cooperation from the lower right quartile (2, most extensive), via upper right (1) and up-
per left (3), to the lower left quartile (4, most intensive). 
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Figure 2: Model of the governance modes of service development for mobile telecom 
networks. 
 
 
Four Cases 
Methodology: 
In what follows, four cases are presented of service development projects for mobile net-
works, one for each quadrant in the model. They aim to illustrate the relationships be-
tween the concepts in practice. Since the initial propositions involved in the model are 
compared with the findings from the cases, the cases be characterized as ‘explanatory’ in 
terms of Yin (1994, pp. 110-111. See also Eisenhardt, 1989).  
For each case study, four sets of variables and their relations are assessed (figure 
3). Firstly, the life cycle of the network and service is determined based on the criteria 
mentioned before. For the network these include the degree to which the type of users 
and the dominant type of use have become clear and the degree of standardization of in-
terfaces with services. For the service this depends on the degree of similarity with exist-
ing services, and, consequently, the degree that the target user group and the dominant 
type of use have become clear. Secondly, for each case the degree of uncertainty and ur-
gency are assessed. The technological uncertainty depends on the availability of informa-
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tion on the software infrastructure and interfaces. The market uncertainty depends on in-
formation on the target customers and their requirements. The degree of urgency depends 
on the need felt by the parties to develop the service within a short time-to-market, for the 
purpose to acquire an early installed base. Thirdly, the number of redesigns and their rea-
sons (market or technology factors) and the required intensity of the communication are 
investigated for each case. And fourthly, the mode of governance is determined, includ-
ing the division of the decision rights, and the opinions of the participants on its appropri-
ateness. The appropriateness depends on the degree that the governance mode has facili-
tated the required redesigns and intensity of communication in an efficient way, and the 
degree that the division of decision rights and risks conforms to the degrees of urgency 
felt by the parties involved. For each case I evaluate the extent that these four sets of 
variables are related and confirm the hypothesized relations behind the model. 
In the data collection procedure first five cases were selected from the popular 
press. Product documentation was collected and an interview was held with a project 
manager. Based on this information three cases appeared to concern content services (and 
not just a platform development or the development of a new channel). These three cases 
appeared to cover three of the four quartiles. An additional case was sought for the last 
quartile (1). For all cases additional interviews with project managers and participants of 
the projects were held. To increase the quality of the case studies (Yin, 1994, pp. 144-
145), the main informants reviewed the draft case reports. Corrections on the actual facts 
were made, if necessary by collecting additional information.  
In the description of the cases in the next section we again start with the case for 
the upper right hand quartile of the network (1), via lower right (2) and upper left quartile 
(3), to the lower left quartile (4) (see figure 4). The text on each case starts with a short 
description of the network, the service and the firm. This is followed by a description of 
the development process of the service. Next the variables from the model are discussed, 
in the same order as they were mentioned above. Finally the relationships between the 
variables are discussed and the variables are compared to the model. 
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Figure 4: The position in the life cycle of the four cases. 
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1. The Mobile Banking project (Specific/mature network, specific/mature service)2 
Near the end of 2000 the Postbank NV and Telfort started a project to offer mobile bank-
ing services to customers of the bank on a large scale. The Postbank is one of the Nether-
lands’ largest retail banks with more than seven million customers. At that moment more 
than one million of its customers used the bank’s existing Internet banking facilities. Tel-
fort is a medium-sized telecom operator with 920,000 postpaid en prepaid Dutch clients 
on its GSM network in April 2001. Telfort is wholly owned by MmO2, the former mo-
bile business of British Telecom. The purpose of the Mobile Banking project was to be 
the first to introduce mobile banking in the Netherlands. The customers were offered a 
mobile WAP phone at low cost to stimulate adoption of the new service. 
 For the telecom operator this project offered the possibility to extend its customer 
base considerably. The project aimed at a maximum of 500,000 customers, which meant 
that this telecom operator would in one step extend its customer base by more than 50%. 
For the bank the project provided an opportunity to promote the use of its electronic ser-
vices by means of a new channel. The bank wanted to offer several basic services on a 
mobile network: electronic transfers and reproduction of balance. It meant that Telfort 
was aiming to acquire new customers and the Postbank aimed to deliver its services 
through a new channel for existing customers. An additional occasional reason was that 
the bank wanted to provide the phones as the regular summer gift promotion for custom-
ers, which required fast delivery. Each user that applied for this service got a mobile 
phone for free, with a free prepaid budget of 25 guilders (10 dollars) and the only obliga-
tion to increase the budget by the same amount within some weeks. Upgrading of the 
phone credit could be done from the bank account by means of the mobile phone. 
 The Postbank initiated the project, and found in Telfort its partner. The Postbank 
was responsible for the development of the Mobile Banking service, which would be of-
fered through the special WAP handsets. Telfort provided the necessary network infra-
structure and knowledge of mobile data communication, and Telfort purchased the hand-
sets and the SIM-cards. Genie, the mobile Internet division of MmO2, provided the so-
called portal through which the users got access to their account. Genie also provided the 
platform that formed the connection between the service and the mobile network. Sie-
mens supplied the specially prepared handsets. Customer service was provided by both 
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Telfort and Postbank, each for its respective part of the services offered to the customer. 
A separate project organization was formed, located in the city of Baarn. The project or-
ganization not only consisted of Telfort and Postbank employees, but also a number of 
consultants and a number of employees of Genie and Siemens were involved.  
 The project organization’s primary purpose was to overcome technical difficul-
ties. Intensive preparation and communication between Telfort and Postbank was re-
quired, for example to connect bank accounts to SIMs, and to offer a secure access to 
customers. But also communication about packaging, manuals and marketing took place 
between the Postbank and Telfort, although three separate customer manuals were made 
for the handsets, the mobile services and the banking services. Technical decisions and 
decisions on the design of the service were made jointly between them. The bank decided 
on the functionality, which included the service that was delivered. As far as the design 
of the service was concerned some specific choices were made. On the SIM-card the 
Postbank application and encryption was inscribed. For security purposes a type of PKI 
(Public Key Infrastructure) was used. This software secured the identity of the user and 
the secrecy of the connection. Users had to identify themselves with a PIN-code for each 
transaction. The two parties disagreed on the type of payment by the users for the use of 
the handsets. The bank preferred a prepaid form, since this would reduce potential barri-
ers for users. Telfort preferred a subscription. In the end, the bank got what it wanted, af-
ter intervention from top management.  
 The reaction of the target customers on the offer was very positive. The number 
of requests exceeded the number of handsets available. First delivery of the handsets 
started in early July 2001. After three months, 90% of all handsets were delivered, about 
80% of the customers had activated the telephone in order to use it. However, only 20% 
of them had used the mobile banking functionality at that moment, and their number did 
hardly increase later on. 
 In terms of our framework, this project fits best in the quartile: transi-
tional/specific network and transitional/specific service. The network, WAP, was already 
proven technology. Although the network had very few users, it had matured in the sense 
of its technological infrastructure and its usability (data communication), embodied in the 
platform of Genie. The service can be characterized as transitional/specific since the bank 
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already had offered the same electronic banking services for quite some time on the 
Internet. The bank wanted to create a new channel to its customers for these services, but 
the services themselves were not new. The technical choices that were made in this pro-
ject can be considered diversifications within the specifications of the WAP network. The 
design choices, such as building software into the SIM-chip, would be considered better 
optimizations of the product design of the mobile phone for a specific type of use, a char-
acteristic of products in the mature phase of the life cycle. In fact it meant that the soft-
ware infrastructure of the WAP network was adapted for this specific application.  
In accordance to our model, technological and market uncertainty appeared to be 
low. Within the project technical design choices had to be made, but these had no relation 
to radical changes in technology or market, as is often the case in the fluid phase. There 
was intense communication in the project, which was neither caused by changes in the 
technology or market. The market uncertainty was low, since the target users and their 
requirements were reasonably well known. In accordance with our model, urgency for 
Telfort was rather low. The fact that Telfort used this application to extend its customer 
base dramatically did not serve to acquire the dominant design of the network (which 
would be the case in the fluid phase of a product or network) but was just an attempt to 
extend its market share through diversification (a characteristic of the mature phase). The 
Postbank felt a higher sense of urgency than expected. The fact that other Dutch banks 
were developing mobile banking facilities as well motivated it to press on in its efforts. It 
wanted to be the first to offer mobile banking services in the Netherlands to its customers. 
This would not bring additional benefits, since customers will not easily change banks 
because of the mobile banking applications, but the bank wanted to strengthen its innova-
tive image. The function as summer gift formed an additional reason for the urgency felt. 
In accordance to the expectations resulting from the model, hardly any redesigns were 
made in the development project. However, the communication between the two parties 
was more intense than expected, mainly because of the technical adaptations in the net-
work (particularly in the SIM-card). 
 The mode of governance in this project agrees with the framework to a limited 
extent (‘Telecom operator offers network. Division of risks’). The two parties collabo-
rated on an equal basis, sharing the risks. The telecom operator offered its network. How-
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ever, a separate project organization was formed, which would not be expected in this 
case. The fact that the Postbank felt a higher urgency than expected and the changes re-
quired in the software of the telecom network and in the handsets may explain this situa-
tion. According to the Postbank employees involved, they in reality had a lead in the pro-
ject and Telfort employees did a lot of their work within their own organization, which in 
fact conforms to the model. Moreover, in retrospect the CEO of the Postbank stated that 
if he did the project again, he would take a longer time-to-market. Apparently, in retro-
spect he considered the urgency in the project higher than functional. It means that on the 
point of urgency and intensity of communication this case differed slightly from the ex-
pectations resulting from the model. 
 
2. The ‘Oerol’-festival service (Specific/mature network, fluid service)3 
In the first half of 2001 the Dutch public broadcast organization VARA and the software 
house and consultancy firm CMG developed an SMS service for the visitors of the so-
called Oerol festival. This festival is a yearly event which place on a Dutch island; people 
from all over come together to enjoy theatre, music, cabaret and acrobatics. The service 
offered the visitors an ‘alert service’: regular SMS-messages with information on specific 
activities in the program, changes in the program, surprise acts, etc. Furthermore, the visi-
tors received information on the weather, lodging facilities, special offers by local shops 
and restaurants; they could participate in a telephone guided bicycle tour with hidden 
theatre acts on the road (questions had to be correctly answered to get the next route in-
structions), and other games. Users could also make a SMS mailing list of people to 
whom they could send a simultaneous SMS message, and they could send requests and 
questions to DJs of the VARA. 10.000 of the 40.000 visitors to the festival subscribed to 
the services, which were free except for the cost of the SMS-messages. This number of 
users was about the target. The initiators developed the service mainly for publicity pur-
poses, and did not aim to have revenues from it. CMG and VARA developed the service 
and paid the development costs. The telecom operators had the income of the SMS mes-
sages, which were paid by the telephone owners. VARA and CMG refrained from the 
possibility of generating income by charging an extra fee for the SMS messages. In case 
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they had charged, the Telecom operator had clear tables of rates for the division of those 
extra fees between themselves and the service providers. 
 In the development project, first a multi-channel platform (GSM, Internet) was 
developed (called Mobile2You) which provided access to different telecom operators to 
support the implementation of new services. This phase took about two months. Next the 
service itself was designed and built in about four weeks. A third party, the German firm 
Materna, organized the transmission of the messages between the CMG network and the 
networks of the telecom operators. Technical changes had to be made in between because 
it appeared that the connections were not always stable. In the course of the development 
trajectory hardly any changes were made in the design. The target services were clear, 
and there was no opportunity to test them. The period of the festival was too short to 
make changes in applications, except for a hunt that was developed on request of the ra-
dio station during the event. However, after the event the software supporting the service 
was split to modules, parts of which were re-used for a similar application at a trade fair 
and to support TV-events. It means that a search process involving the target market and 
the requirements of the customers took place after the Oerol application. 
 In terms of our model, the Oerol service for SMS is a clear example of a mature 
network (SMS) and a new, fluid service. The two institutes developed the service in co-
operation, whereby VARA was the content owner and CMG the technological expert. 
Together they formed the ‘service firm’ from our model.4 In accordance with the model, 
technological uncertainty in this case was low. CMG still had to build a platform, but 
similar platforms already existed and thus the technological uncertainty involved in this 
design and development of the platform was low. Consequently the platform was built in 
a short period. The existence of clear tables of rates for the division of income from addi-
tional charges for SMS messages also indicates that the network was mature. The market 
uncertainty has to be rated medium, since the market of the network was established but 
this type of service did not yet exist in the Netherlands. The urgency of the telecom op-
erator with respect to the development of the service was of course low. The urgency felt 
by one of the service firms was slightly lower than expected, since this service was not 
central to the business of the VARA. For CMG the service and its time-to-market were 
important, since CMG wanted to create a new business based on this type of services. 
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The market uncertainty resulted in a search process concerning market and customers’ 
preferences. Communication between telco and service firms was, of course, almost nil in 
this case, as expected in this quartile of the model. 
As far as the governance mode is concerned, according to the model in this situa-
tion a disintegrated form in which the service firm takes the risks is most appropriate 
(‘Telecom operator offers network. Service firm takes risks’). That mode of governance 
facilitates the frequent design changes that are required as a consequence of market un-
certainty, whereas communication with the telecom operator on technical aspects is not 
required. Indeed, in this case the service firms developed the service on their own, with-
out the involvement of telecom operators, and they also took the risks. Although CMG 
was not satisfied with the fact that the telecom firms did not remit larger part of the basic 
revenues of the SMS-traffic, the governance mode can be characterized as appropriate. 
Or, put another way, if in this situation the telecom operator had been involved, a lot of 
communication would have been required to facilitate the design changes that resulted 
from the high level of market uncertainty. 
 
3. The WAP route planner (Fluid network, mature service)5 
The third case involves a product-development project of a route planner for WAP mo-
bile telephones. The service was developed in the period October 1999 – March 2001. 
The telecom operator involved was the Dutch KPN. The service firm, AND Publishing 
Co. (pronounce AND as A-N-D), was a producer of route planners on CD ROM and the 
Internet. The route planner for the WAP telephone was a derivative of existing route 
planner services for the Internet, running on a new network. For AND the project opened 
the possibility for future new business on the WAP network. Moreover, the presence of 
AND and its route planner on WAP could be a stimulus for other firms which would re-
quire a route planner as part of their WAP services in the future (for instance a yellow 
page service on WAP including a route planner) to use the AND route planner for their 
purposes, since the end customers would already know it. This would create additional 
revenues in the future in the form of license fees. The product manager responsible for 
the WAP route planner stressed the importance of the telecom operator for the future suc-
cess of the WAP route planner: “Its application by this telecom operator in fact means 
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free advertisement for our product. The supply of our product forms an investment in 
visibility.” 
 The project was planned and executed as a cooperation project between KPN and 
AND. KPN was in the build-up phase of its WAP services and took the initiative for the 
project. KPN invited AND to participate. KPN insisted that AND would take the costs of 
development itself, which delayed the negotiations. AND would participate in the reve-
nues that the use of the route planner would generate. AND only agreed to develop the 
service shortly before the WAP network became operational.  
The product manager at AND managed the relations with KPN. He developed the 
product specifications in close interaction with KPN. The required alignment between the 
design of the route planner and the software for the WAP telephone was an important 
reason to communicate regularly with the telecom operator. Moreover the telecom opera-
tor had experience with, and knowledge of, the requirements of the end customers. A de-
sign was chosen that remained very close to other route planners of AND. The customer 
had to specify the locations of the place of departure and of the destiny, and then the ser-
vice responded with the shortest route. No use was made of information on the location 
of the user, since that was not yet technically feasible. During the development trajectory 
the telecom operator did not ask for changes in the design. In retrospect the Product Man-
ager of AND concludes: ‘We chose the right design from the beginning, right the first 
time’. A change was made some months after the introduction when a zooming function 
was added, which allowed the user to get more detailed information on a specific part of 
the road system. Nevertheless, the functional design did not require much communica-
tion. Technical issues required more communication, for instance the billing system of 
the service had to be adapted to the software of both KPN and AND. Moreover a techni-
cal problem emerged when it became clear that handsets of different manufacturers all 
had their own specifications. AND had to make variations of its service for every type of 
mobile phone.  
The project was successful as far as the primary result, a working route planner 
was developed. However, the WAP network as such was not successful, at least in the 
short run. Many early adopters conceived WAP as too slow to be interesting. Moreover 
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the handsets were only produced in low quantities, since manufacturers were at the same 
time busy producing telephones for the booming GSM network. 
In terms of the model presented above the project aimed to develop a service for a 
network (WAP) that then was still in its fluid phase. The service itself was in fact in its 
mature phase, since it was a variation of an existing route planner for a new channel. 
AND did not add important new features, such as automatic reference to the actual loca-
tion of the user, which might have created new types of use and a new market. Technical 
uncertainty was high, since information on the software infrastructure was lacking. Mar-
ket uncertainty with respect to the network was high, resulting from the unpredictability 
of the use of WAP network, since it was uncertain who would use this telephone and for 
what types of new services. Market uncertainty with respect to the service itself was low. 
As far as the degree of urgency is concerned, in accordance to the model KPN clearly felt 
a high degree of urgency with respect to the timely delivery of the service. However, 
AND experienced a higher degree of urgency than the model anticipates. For AND the 
new service was not just a new channel to the customer, but AND expected to create a 
new business. The number of design changes has to be classified as medium, particularly 
because of the adaptations to the handsets. In fact also adaptations in the design to the 
market would be expected, based on the fact that the use of the phones normally is differ-
ent from expected. Paradoxically, one of the reasons that no larger number of modifica-
tions of the design had to be made was the low diffusion of the WAP telephone. The 
small number of users hardly made demands on the lay out of services either; and if they 
did, it would not have been worth the investment for the operators to respond by adapting 
the services. Technological uncertainty did require communication in the project. Particu-
larly the billing system and the standards of the handsets required intensive communica-
tion on, and adaptations of, the design of the software of the route planner.  
 In terms of the model, in this case the governance mode ‘Division of tasks. Tele-
com operator takes largest part of the risks’ would be expected. The telecom operator 
indeed participated in the design of the service, but the service firm took most of the 
risks. In retrospect AND does not consider the actual mode of cooperation in this case 
appropriate. According to this firm, the telecom operator should have taken a larger share 
of the business risk and should have provided the technical infrastructure to make this 
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business model successful. This is of course an understandable position, since AND was 
not prepared to share the risk for further product development alone, which of course in-
duces the opinion to members of this firm that the telecom operator would have had to 
take a larger part. For the same reasons in retrospect the telecom operator was satisfied 
with the form of cooperation that was chosen. From an outside point of view it is clear 
that a larger role of the telecom operator could have created advantages in efficiency, 
since the telecom operator was the appropriate party to build the billing system and to 
adapt the service to the manufacture of the handsets. This form of cooperation would 
have diminished the cost of communication. 
In general, the relations between the variables in this case conforms to the model 
as far as the degrees of uncertainty, the redesigns for technical reasons and the degree of 
urgency experienced by KPN are concerned. The degree of urgency experienced by AND 
and the governance mode differed from the model since the telecom operator performed a 
smaller part of the activities, and took a smaller part of the risks than anticipated by the 
model. However, the information on the development trajectory supports the view that 
the mode of governance advanced by the model would possibly have been more appro-
priate from an efficiency perspective. 
 
4. Wireless ASP (Fluid network, fluid service)6 
In the period May-September 2001 the Dutch telecom operator Telfort and the Dutch firm 
UniXS Solutions developed a wireless ASP service for Telfort’s GPRS network. UniXS 
was a wireless ASP (Application Service Provider) which offered customers the opportunity 
to use the GPRS network to provide data and application support to their mobile employees. 
The customer’s application was run on the system of UniXS. One of the first customers of 
this service was a mental health care organization (Robert Fleury Stichting) that used the 
service for an electronic medical record system. With this system the health care organiza-
tion provided on line data and application support to its mobile practitioners. The practitio-
ners could retrieve and modify the record of a specific patient at the patient’s home or else-
where, also if he or she visited the patient unprepared (for instance since the patient or others 
had asked for assistance). The data included, for instance, the prescription of the medication 
of the patient. With this system the practitioner remained online the whole day. Telfort pro-
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vided the GPRS network. UniXS, a start-up firm dedicated to Wireless ASP solutions, built 
the application, including the software to support the service. For that purpose UniXS de-
veloped a platform (based on IBM software) that formed a standard basis for this type of 
services, and on which the application of a specific customer could be developed. The cus-
tomer’s application (in this case the electronic medical record system) ran on the servers of 
UniXS, which were connected to the GPRS network. The database itself remained with the 
customer, but was in contact with the ASP server. 
 Up to the first pilot, the project took about half a year (May 2001- October 2001). 
The first idea was to provide the practitioners with a hand-held organizer connected to a 
GPRS phone by a cable. This idea was abandoned when Ericsson, the supplier of the GPRS 
phones, offered the possibility to use a BlueTooth connection between the two devices. 
Compaq supplied the hand-held organizers (iPAQ). UniXS and Telfort organized the com-
munication between all parties involved. Telfort managed the relations with Compaq and 
Ericsson, UniXS integrated the relations with these parties and managed the relation with 
the health care organization and with the software vendor of that organization. In October 
2001 a test was conducted involving four practitioners, which was received favorable by the 
health care organization. As a result of the application, the practitioners involved could even 
visit five patients a day instead of four. 
 In this phase of the project the three most important parties involved shared the costs 
of the development of the service: Telfort, UniXS and the health care organization. Both 
Ericsson and Compaq participated financially in the project by providing respectively the 
GPRS phones and the organizers. The health care organization paid a fixed fee for the de-
velopment of the service and for its operation during the test period. UniXS made an up-
front investment in the platform, and took the risks in case unanticipated events occurred. 
The relation between Telfort and UniXS was open in the sense that UniXS had an agree-
ment with Telfort for an exclusive cooperation in the health sector, but in other sectors they 
could both collaborate with other parties. UniXS and the customer had a more exclusive re-
lation, since changing the customer’s application to another platform would require new de-
velopment activities.  
In the second phase, new negotiations started about the financial arrangement be-
tween the customer, UniXS and Telfort. In the new arrangement the revenues of the service 
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were split between the Telfort, for the use of the network, and UniXS, for the Wireless ASP 
service. A second redesign took place in this phase, since the mobile telephone and the 
handheld were replaced by a single device (a so-called XDA). In this period, the relation 
between UniXS and Telfort became tighter: the parties agreed that in the future Telfort 
would do the marketing of the services, and UniXS in fact became the supplier. Still, both 
parties invested in this application. 
 In terms of our model, this application concerns a fluid service for a fluid plat-
form. The service was new, since no similar mobile service had existed for these users up 
to that point. GPRS as a network was also new at the time; this case even was one of the 
first GPRS applications in Europe. It has to be noted that the case differs slightly from the 
general issue of this paper, which refers to content services. In this case two services are 
developed: (1) UniXS and Telfort offered a channel as a service to the customer, in this 
case the health care organization, through which it could communicate with its employ-
ees. (2) The customer supplied content to its employees. 
In spite of this difference, the case is in line with the assumptions from the model 
regarding the degree of uncertainty, urgency, the number of redesigns and the intensity of 
communication. Technological and market uncertainty were high. Technological uncer-
tainty was high since platforms for GPRS were not generally available, as was the case 
for GPRS handsets with integrated computer facilities. Market uncertainty was high since 
it was yet unclear which type of customers would become dominant for GPRS (e.g. busi-
ness or private customers) since it was unclear what the dominant type of use would be. 
Both the telecom operator Telfort and the service firm UniXS clearly felt a high degree of 
urgency, since both wanted to remain ahead in the market. As a consequence of the high 
levels of uncertainty, intensive communication between the parties involved was re-
quired. Moreover two important redesigns were made up to the moment of this case study 
and more had to be expected. The high level of uncertainty required repeated negotiations 
on the alliance.  
 The model assumes for this case the governance mode: ‘Internal development by 
telecom operator or independent organization. Telecom operator takes largest part of the 
risks.’ The case does not completely confirm this assumption. Two firms were involved as a 
supplier (UniXS and Telfort), but although these firms did enter into a tighter collaboration 
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in the course of time, they did not create a separate project organization. The establishment 
of such an organization would have made redundant the repeated negotiations on the rela-
tion, since it would have been more flexible with respect to design or market changes. 
Moreover, UniXS as a partner and the health care organization as a first customer took lar-
ger parts of the risks involved than follows from the model. Particularly UniXS, in fact, took 
a high risk; if the Wireless ASP market for business users did not materialize, the investment 
in the platform would be lost. Financial reasons in the telecom sector, which had invested 
heavily in UMTS licenses, seem important in the explanation of the difference between this 
case and the model. In fact, an alternative would have been not to build a platform at all in 
this phase of the network, and first find out what the dominant users and type of use would 
be. The character of UniXS as a start-up company may be another factor. Start-ups often 
make considerable up-front investment and take considerable risk in view of future pros-
pects. They are not used or able to charge every activity to partners. 
 
Discussion 
This paper presented a model for the governance modes of service development for mo-
bile networks, based on life cycle considerations and transaction cost theory. A definition 
of the phases of the life cycle of networks and services was proposed, which involved 
that not only the basic standard of the network formed the dominant design, but that the 
software supporting the network (often embodied in a platform) and the type of applica-
tions were integral parts of the dominant design. The definition of the maturity of the ser-
vice was based on its similarities with existing services on other networks, mainly affect-
ing the degree of market uncertainty involved in the service development process. Four 
case-studies served to explore the usefulness of our definitions of maturity of network 
and service, and to provide indications for the practical relevance of the model. 
 The basic premise of the model involved that the life cycle of the network and the 
service is important for the degrees of uncertainty and urgency involved, which in their 
turn affect the most appropriate mode of governance. It was also assumed that the devel-
opment process of the software supporting the network was an important cause of techno-
logical uncertainty. This software infrastructure is required to facilitate easy access for 
service providers and clients, and includes the software for billing, security and other 
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control tasks of the telecom operator. The cases indeed corroborate the importance of the 
availability of this software for the development process of new services. The design of 
this software system depends on, and has to be developed concurrently with, the new ser-
vices, and thus was not always available beforehand. In the fluid phase of the life cycle of 
the network we found that this software was developed together with, or after, the new 
service (in the Route Planner and Wireless ASP cases). In later phases of the life cycle of 
the network so-called platforms were available, which facilitated the easy provision of 
services by service developers, and which decreased the required intensity of c
cation between telecom and service firm on technical issues concerning the network d
ing the development process considerably. In fact these platforms create an interface be-
tween network and service provider. They create the possibility for the service firm to 
provide its service without worrying about the technical specifications of the network on 
which the client offers the service.7 Some firm
ommuni-
ur-
ry s today develop these platforms in a ve
early stage, before inviting service firms to develop services. This, however, creates the 
danger that the platform becomes rigid in a too early stage, inhibiting specific adjust-
ments of the services in response to customer feedback. 
 The influence of the life cycle on the second source of uncertainty, market uncer-
tainty, was also apparent. Market uncertainty concerning the success of the network and 
the type of target customers existed in the fluid phase of the network in the Route Planner 
and Wireless ASP cases. In the Route Planner case market uncertainty became evident 
from the failure of the WAP network as such. In the Wireless ASP case uncertainty 
clearly was high on the target customer group. Market uncertainty on the preferences of 
the users was evident in the Wireless ASP and Oerol cases. In the Oerol case market un-
certainty resulted in design changes after the Oerol application. In the Wireless ASP such 
changes still have to be expected when the service will be applied to other customers. In 
the Mobile Banking case the degree of uncertainty was considerably lower, and hardly 
any design changes took place. 
 In the model the life cycle of network and service was assumed to affect the level 
of urgency involved. This was assumed to be another factor behind the choice of govern-
ance mode and the division of risks. In the Wireless ASP and Route Planner cases we 
found clear evidence of the importance of urgency at the side of the telecom operators, 
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who had to make respectively the WAP and GPSR network successful. However, con-
trary to expectations, although its service can hardly be qualified as completely new in 
terms of our definitions, also the Postbank appeared to feel a high degree of urgency for 
reasons of reputation associated to m-commerce. In that case the communication between 
the telecom operator and service firm was also more intense than expected. The required 
changes in the software of the network form an explanation. Moreover, the communica-
tion was only necessary for the once-only development of the service, not for repeated 
trials as in other cases. In general, we may conclude that also the distribution of the levels 
of urgency did conform to the assumptions. On the contrary, the forms of governance that 
were applied did not always agree with the expectations. Particularly in the Route Planner 
and Wireless ASP cases the service firm took a higher share in the costs and risks than 
expected. The fact that both service firms were start-ups, for which prospects in general 
are of course the primary source for their existence, may have been of influence. More-
over, in the Wireless ASP case not separate project organization was formed, as expected. 
 The model has practical value for telecom firms and service firms developing new 
mobile services. An interesting aspect in practical applications concerns the transition 
between the four different situations (the quartiles). A service firm that changes from de-
veloping completely new services to developing extensions of mature services for new 
networks has to adapt its mode of cooperation with the telecom firm, but in an incre-
mental way. This is different for a telecom firm that sees its network mature and that co-
operates with service firms developing completely new services (the lower half of the 
model, moving from left to right). The model suggests that such a firm has to change its 
mode of cooperation drastically, from establishing separate project organizations and tak-
ing large part of the risks, to leaving the activities and the risks with the service firm. Of 
course, only awareness and flexibility of the managers of both the telecom operator and 
the service firm can bring about such transitions. 
 Finally, it has to be mentioned that in the research leading to this paper finding a 
case of a really new service in the early fluid phase of the network (thus for the quartile 
‘fluid network, fluid service’) appeared to be the most difficult. Several telecom operators 
appear to choose a low risk strategy when they start a new network by first copying exist-
ing services from other networks. Only after the customers have adopted the network do 
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they introduce completely new services. The financial pressure resulting from the high 
licensing fees that governments in several countries have charged for new mobile net-
works stimulates this behavior. Elsewhere it has been emphasized that government policy 
that ‘accelerates’ the life cycle, for instance by stimulating economies of scale, may be 
detrimental for the long term innovative capabilities of firms (Van den Ende, Wijnberg 
and Meijer, 2001). The question is if in this case the licensing policy has such an acceler-
ating effect. It might mean that firms at the moment do not explore really innovative ap-
plications in the first fluid phase of the life cycle of a new network. If also a platform is 
already built in this first phase, they may severely limit the possibilities for really innova-
tive services on the network in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper a framework was developed for the choice of mode of governance for the 
development of new services for mobile networks, based on life cycle perspective and on 
transaction cost theory. The innovation involved an example of a systemic innovation, 
since network and service are intricately connected. A definition of the life cycle of mo-
bile services was developed based on the differences between that service and existing 
services offered by other channels, including an extension of the concept of dominant de-
sign of the network to the software infrastructure and to its dominant types of use.  
The basic assumption of the paper involved that outsourcing innovation needs not 
always be the most appropriate form in such cases because of rising transaction costs un-
der high uncertainty and because there is no unequivocal division of interests between the 
partners, which hinders the division of risks. Transaction costs resulting from varying de-
grees of uncertainty and urgency during the life cycle were assumed to be the dominant 
factor behind the choice of governance mode. Four case studies (Mobile Banking, Oerol 
Festival Service, Route Planner, Wireless ASP) corroborated the usefulness of the defini-
tions and provided indications that the factors in the model indeed were important in the 
choice of governance mode. Uncertainty was reflected in redesigns and the required in-
tensity of communication; the degree of urgency affected the optimal division of risks. 
The mode of governance has to facilitate the redesigns and the division of risks in a way 
that transactions costs were minimal. Some differences between the proposed govern-
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ment modes and the cases appeared, particularly in the Route Planner and Wireless ASP 
cases (fluid network). However, in both cases there are reasons why the governance 
mode advanced by the model may be a serious alternative. The model seems to be useful 
for the management of firms involved in service development for mobile telecom net-
works. It is an aid in the choice of an appropriate governance mode, but also for the ef-
fective management of the service development process itself.  
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Notes 
1 Asset specific investments, frequency of transactions and uncertainty involved in the transactions are con-
sidered important factors in the choice of governance mode (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1991). 
2 This case study is based on interviews and email communication with Eric Gimbergh, Telfort launch 
manager in the M-banking project (31.05.01), on an interview with Marc van den Held, consultant and pro-
gram manager in the M-banking project on behalf of Telfort (28.05.01), and communication with several 
Postbank employees involved in the project. Furthermore project documentation was used. 
3 For this case study several interviews were held with Edgar Borst, Consultant Business Development at 
CMG, and with Erik Homoet, Manager Business Development at CMG, in the period August-October 
2001. Borst and Homoet were responsible for the Oerol project at CMG. Furthermore, Gerco Grandia, sys-
tem developer at CMG, was interviewed in September 2001 and use was made of several documents on the 
project, including project evaluations. 
4 The fact that two firms together formed the service firm in this case does not make much difference for 
our analysis, since we focus on the relation between the telecom operator and the service firm, including 
transaction costs made in the relation between the two parties, and not on the relation between different 
firms involved in service development. 
5 The information on this case was derived from two personal interviews with René Mijs, Product Manager 
route planners at AND International Publishers and responsible for the WAP route planner project, on 
March 31, 2000, and on August 23, 2001, on a telephone interview with Jeroen Kaandorp, responsible for 
this project at KPN Mobile, on October 1, 2001, and from several written and telephone conversations with 
René Mijs and with Jasper Brouwer, Product Manager for flight data and services at AND Publishers. 
6 For this case study interviews were held with Roy Schutt, Manger Business Development and Partner-
ships of Telfort (16.10.01) and with Evert A.J.F. Kroll, COO and CTO of UniXS (20.11.01). 
7 The importance of such interfaces also appears from other observations in the mobile telecom industry. 
XML as a language provides an interface between telecom operator and service provider, to be able to cre-
ate a division of tasks between telecom operator and service firm in which the burden of the technical soft-
ware infrastructure is kept away from the service firm. 
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